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ABSTRACT Deep brain stimulators (DBSs), a widely used and comprehensively acknowledged restorative
methodology, are a type of implantable medical device which uses electrical stimulation to treat neurological
disorders. These devices are widely used to treat diseases such as Parkinson, movement disorder, epilepsy,
and psychiatric disorders. Security in such devices plays a vital role since it can directly affect the mental,
emotional, and physical state of human bodies. In worst-case situations, it can even lead to the patient’s death.
An adversary in such devices, for instance, can inhibit the normal functionality of the brain by introducing
fake stimulation inside the human brain. Nonetheless, the adversary can impair the motor functions, alter
impulse control, induce pain, or even modify the emotional pattern of the patient by giving fake stimulations
through DBSs. This paper presents a deep learning methodology to predict different attack stimulations
in DBSs. The proposed work uses long short-term memory, a type of recurrent network for forecasting and
predicting rest tremor velocity. (A type of characteristic observed to evaluate the intensity of the neurological
diseases) The prediction helps in diagnosing fake versus genuine stimulations. The effect of deep brain
stimulation was tested on Parkinson tremor patients. The proposed methodology was able to detect different
types of emulated attack patterns efficiently and thereby notifying the patient about the possible attack.
INDEX TERMS Deep brain stimulators, deep learning, implantable medical devices, machine learning,
security.
I. INTRODUCTION
For a few decades electrical stimulation has been utilized
to tweak the sensory and neurological system in human
patients [1]. The principal reports of deep brain stimu-
lation, being utilized to treat Parkinsons disease at pro-
fessor Benabid’s facility, were distributed in 1993 despite
the fact that the group had performed initial experiments
in 1987 [2]. In 2002, Deep Brain Stimulators (DBS) were
granted endorsement by the US Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) for the treatment of Parkinson’s ailment [3].
Thereafter, DBS, which utilizes a pacemaker-like gadget to
convey consistent electrical stimulation inside the cerebrum,
has been utilized to treat more than 100,000 individuals
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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around the world with Parkinsons disease and tremor.
The worldwide DBS market was estimated to be around
USD 618.6 million in 2014 and is expected to grow at a
compound annual growth rate of over 17.0% over the next
years [4]. Worldwide DBS market is expected to achieve
USD 1,592.9 million by 2020, as per a review by Grand View
Research, Inc [5]. Current DBS frameworks incorporate a
quadripolar electrode embedded into the human brain, inline
expansions either running behind or embedded inside the ear,
and an Implantable Pulse Generator (IPG) embedded either
on top of or inside the region above the chest as shown
in Figure 1. The patient is given a controller to turn the device
on or off. Some IPGs can likewise be customized to permit
the patient to change the voltage inside set points of con-
finement. Needless to say DBS has led to enhancements and
personal life satisfaction in patient’s with Parkinson disease.
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FIGURE 1. Threat Model: Adversary inhibit the implanted DBS inorder to
generate fake stimulations.
It has also shown tremendous efficacy for patients with move-
ment disorders. It has been estimated that there are over
180,000 individuals in the United States below 70 years of
age with Parkinson Disease [6]. Moreover, depression influ-
ences more than 18 million individuals in the United States
alone [7]. Notwithstanding psychiatric disorders, DBS has
additionally been proposed as a potential treatment for hyper-
tension, obesity and dietary issues. Also, it is also being used
for neurological pains and headaches [8]. Medtronic65 and
Advanced Neurologic Frameworks are some of the types of
frameworks which are utilized as a part of DBS.
A novel innovation such as DBS has a set of issues espe-
cially related to security. This requires training of doctors,
medical attendants, and patients to learn how to deal with
these unpredictable security issues in such gadgets. The abil-
ity to control the gadget, and generate stimulation, allows
us to perform randomized, blinded, hybrid trials to assess
the efficacy of the device [9]. With practical imaging and
fundamental science systems recognizing discrete regions of
the brain associated with various neurological and psychiatric
conditions, security to such vulnerable device plays a major
role. Archimedes [10] has demonstrated that they could forge
an erratic signal with radio frequency electromagnetic waves
in order to hack the implants inside the body. Theoretically,
a false signal, like the one they created, could inhibit required
stimulation or induce unnecessary shocks in human brain.
Thus, brain implants such as DBS are turning out to be a
more typical example of a device that can be hacked. As the
brain implants are getting cheaper and better, more and more
patients are heavily relying on them. Consider what a terrorist
could dowith the access to a politician’smind or how coercive
blackmail would be if someone were to alter how you act and
think? To date, while there are few accidents or disasters due
to faulty or malicious devices, as the volume and application
space increases, these devices would be more prone to such
attacks.
The future of neurological implants is bright, but even a
single high-profile incident could irreparably damage public
confidence in the safety of these devices, so the risk of brain
jacking should be taken seriously and proactively before it is
too late. The methodology proposed in this paper brain tunes
DBSwith the help of its own replica, i.e., a biologically neural
inspired model, to develop an efficient, robust and secure
solution. The proposed work, i.e., deep learning strategy,
is inspired from biological neural networks (human brain).
The biological neural network comprises of interconnected
neurons utilized to trade messages between one another. The
interconnections have weights that can be tuned with respect
to experience, thus making neural networks fit for learn-
ing [11]. The objective here is not to make practical models
of the human brain, but rather to create robust and effective
information structures that we can use to model difficult
problems. This paper presents techniques to emulate attack
patterns and propose deep learning strategy to classify differ-
ent attack patterns for deep brain implants. The outline of the
paper is as follows: Section II presents the related work on the
security of implantable medical devices. Section III provides
an insight on the network and attack model. Section IV
presents the details on the proposed model. This section also
gives the motivation for the proposed problem. Results of the
proposed work is shown in Section V. Section VI concludes
the paper and presents scope for future work.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
Wireless Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) have wireless
capability of transmitting information. This capability pro-
vides room for the attackers to eavesdrop the information,
compromise the patient’s data with the intent to physically
harm them by reprogramming the implanted devices [12]. For
instance, an intruder can listen to an IMD’s radio transmis-
sions and can frequently learn private data with insignificant
effort from his side. Such an attack can access to the data
acquisition of an oscilloscope, programming radio, direc-
tional receivingwires, and other listening gears of themedical
devices. A few reviews have considered such an attack of
listening stealthily or eavesdropping to steal patients’ infor-
mation [13], [14]. Besides this, another type of attack can be
introduced in IMDs where in the intruder has the capability
to create radio transmissions to replay repeated operations
and commands. A study performed by Halperin et al. [15]
shows that with a programmable radio, one can control
an implanted defibrillator by replaying messages, thereby
incapacitating modified treatments. Alternatively, it can also
convey a message to stun planned to initiate a deadly heart
attack. Insulin pumps used to monitor glucose for the diabetic
patients works on an open loopmethodology, i.e., they require
patients to change the pump setting [16].Modifying the pump
settings showed a threat vulnerability which proved to be
a crucial concern for the patients. Work presented in [13]
has shown comparable control over an insulin pump, includ-
ing the capacity to stop insulin or infuse enormous dosage.
Another way is to dismantle the framework to control the
device operation. By assessing the Java-based program pro-
vided with his own particular insulin pump, analyst Jerome
Radcliffe was able to figure out the insulin pump’s structure,
uncovering that the pump neglected to preserve the medical
VOLUME 7, 2019 24155
H. Rathore et al.: Novel Deep Learning Strategy for Classifying Different Attack Patterns
information it transmitted [17]. Moreover, there may be a
situation which is much more coordinated where the attacker
can be both near the patient and the device programmer. Even
during the setting or modifying of the IMD code for security,
software/hardware engineer or health care professional can
install a malign code to give excess dosage in case of medical
devices. Thus, IMDs should address the above mentioned
threat vulnerabilities to ensure safety, security, availability
and privacy for the patients. Thus, these medical devices
should be secure to capture any sort of threat that can be
injurious for the health of the patients.
There are a number of diverse solutions which address
the security issues in wireless IMDs [18]. Bio-metric based
approaches access the unique physiological characteristics
of the human body and provide authentication. Though the
mechanism is secure and lightweight, the scheme lacks to
accommodate the changes of bio-metric with respect to
time [19], [20]. Distance based approaches estimate the
physical distance between the IMD and the caregiver by uti-
lizing the transmitted and received transmission in proximity
through piezoelectric elements [15], Diffie Hellam proto-
col [21], and near field communication [22]. The scheme
fails since the attacker can make a physical connection with
the patient by approaching in near proximity, thus leading to
weak authentication. Key management protocols are used for
providing authentication to the authorised users using sym-
metric [15], public key [23] and physiological [24] signals for
the generation of keys. Key management protocols are less
reliable and incur extra waiting time for the authentication.
Additionally, anomaly detection mechanism such as deep
learning [29], [30] and support vector machines [28], [31]
have been used for determining the dosage pattern for
the insulin pump security. External device methodologies
employ extra devices to be worn to provide authentication
such as IMDGaurd [36], MedMon [37], Cloaker [38] and
IMDShield [39]. These methodologies not only require extra
gadget to be carried besides the wireless medical device, but
also consume battery life of the medical device. Additionally,
the adversary can come close to the patient and disrupt the
functionality of the device. Besides this, there are a diverse
set of the conventional schemes utilized for overcoming
attacks in wireless medical devices [32]–[35]. Several other
papers (e.g., [40]–[42]) studied related security issues to such
gadgets.
The present state of art does not provides security solutions
for DBS. This paper is a first attempt towards classifying
attack patterns of DBS. It presents a fast and efficient model
for improving the security issues in DBS with the help of
human inspired model, viz deep learning strategy. Though
Pycroft et al. [25] study the types of attacks in implantable
DBS, we emulate some of the attacks presented in [25] and
predict them using deep learning strategy. More specifically,
this paper plans to achieve the following research objectives:
• Design and train a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM),
a deep learning classifier to predict and forecast consec-
utive brain stimulation pattern.
FIGURE 2. Stimulation waveform in DBS.
• Emulate different types of attack patterns and classify
them in deep brain implants, i.e., determine or classify
the type of attack strategy used by the attacker. More
specifically, a prediction mechanism is developed by
emulating different attack patterns that can be utilized
by the attacker. Once the attack has been predicted by
the classifier, patient is notified about the attack.
III. NETWORK AND ATTACK MODEL
A. ADVERSARY MODEL
Neural implants such as DBS are intended to stimulate
certain regions of the brain for the treatment of various
chronic diseases. DBSs are implanted to treat diseases such
as Parkinsons disease, chronic pain, and other therapeutic
conditions such as tremors, movement disorders, and psychi-
atric treatment. In the near future, DBSs hold the potential
to be ubiquitous, mechanically fit, thereby addressing more
extensive clinical needs [26]. As this happens addressing
brain implants security turns out to be a key challenge. For
instance, patients may endeavor to self-endorse raised states
of mind or expanded initiation in the cerebrum, or pro-
grammers may endeavor to program the stimulation treat-
ment. However these perfectly valid actions may breach the
integrity property of the device. Moreover, the attacker can
damage the brain cells or can cause diverse neural path-
ways by inserting the mind with arbitrary stimulation signals.
On the other hand, attacker may remotely keep the gadget
from working as designed to diminish availability property.
Besides that, the risk escalates if the patient is receiving
treatment on more sensitive condition such as depression.
Pycroft et al. [25] have divided the types of attacks in DBS
in two ways namely blind attacks and targeted attacks. Blind
attacks include cessation of stimulation, draining implant
batteries, inducing tissue damage, and information theft.
Targeted attacks include impairment of motor function, alter-
ation of impulse control, modification of emotions or affect,
induction of pain, and modulation of the reward system.
In this paper, we would investigate these attacks by emulating
these attack patterns and classifying them.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The primary goal of DBS is to superimpose a stimula-
tion pattern over the patient’s chronic pain pattern and to
establish a correct stimulation waveform with the help of
specified stimulation parameters such as amplitude, pulse
width, effective or ineffective stimulation etc. Figure 2 shows
a typical continuous stimulation waveform given to DBS.
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When an external reader attempts to connect with an IMD,
authentication followed by communication between the IMD
and the reader is made. In such cases, the attacker can modify
the stimulation pattern in order to introduce acute stimulation
pattern inside the human brain. The attacker can introduce
different types of stimulation parameters to disrupt the normal
functionality of the DBS. This paper emulates different types
of attack strategies by changing the patterns of pulse width,
stimulation rate, intensity etc. It then studies the pattern of rest
tremor velocity (a type of characteristic observed to evaluate
the intensity of the neurological diseases) based on the pattern
of introduced attack strategies.
IV. PROPOSED WORK
A. MOTIVATION
Biological systems have caught the attention of scientific
community in diverse fields such as computer science,
mechanical, agriculture, energy etc [27]. Bio-inspired sys-
tems refer to applying concepts from biology domain such
as body and brain operation to practical problems in other
domains such as security and intrusion prevention. Biolog-
ically inspired approaches seem promising and are consid-
ered stronger in comparison to any other system. It can be
observed that, in contrast to the existingmodels which require
regular updating, replacement, nourishing, bio-inspired mod-
els maintain themselves and even learn during changing
conditions. Therefore, engineers and scientists of diverse
domains are engaging themselves in investigating innovative
design architectures to resolve different challenges. In the
near future we may even create machines that repair them-
selves, like the way skin recuperates over an injury. The
future of engineering lies in the development of flexible, self-
healing bio-inspired models.
B. RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORK
Deep learning, a type of biologically inspired model, is a
special branch of machine learning used to understand the
inbuilt patterns in the information. Deep learning model
comprises of neural network training which conditions the
available data by calibrating the weights and input data with
the help of an activation function. This paper uses recur-
rent neural network which permits the information to per-
sist. With recurrent neural network, the input data is passed
into a cell, which besides outputting the activation function,
passes the output as a feedback to the cell. Long Short Term
Memory (LSTM) network is a type of recurrent neural net-
work which stores the information for longer period of time.
LSTM, with the help of Keep Gate or Forget Gate, decides
which data to keep, or remove from the recurring data. Those
gates either block or pass on the information recieved based
on its strength. This action, similar to neural networks, is done
by filtering with their own sets of weights. Those weights,
like the weights that modulate input and hidden states, are
adjusted via the recurrent networks learning process. That
is, the cells learn when to allow data to enter, leave or be
deleted through the iterative process of making guesses,
FIGURE 3. Detailed schematic of simple recurrent neural network and
long short term memory neural network (reproduced from [44]).
backpropagating error, and adjusting weights via gradient
descent.
Figure 3 shows the schematic diagram of a simple recurrent
neural network and LSTM neural network. LSTMs’ memory
cells give different roles to addition and multiplication in
the transformation of input. The central plus sign (additional
node) helps them preserve a constant error when it must be
backpropagated at depth. Instead of determining the subse-
quent cell state bymultiplying its current state with new input,
they add the two. Different sets of weights filter the input
data for input, output and forgetting gates. The forget gate is
represented as a linear identity function, because if the gate is
open, the current state of thememory cell is simplymultiplied
by one, to propagate forward one more time step.
C. LSTM FOR PARKINSON DISEASE
This paper has two contributions. First, we design and train a
LSTM classifier to predict consecutive deep brain stimulation
patterns for all the patients. Secondly, we emulate and predict
different types of attack patterns in deep brain implants for
individual patients. By doing so we can determine the type
of attack strategy that can be used by the attacker. More
specifically, a prediction mechanism is developed by emu-
lating different attack patterns to change brain stimulation
parameters which can be utilized by the attacker for deep
brain implants.
1) MULTIVARIATE LSTM FORECAST MODEL FOR
ALL PATIENTS
The essential objective of programming the neurostimulators
is to superimpose the stimulation or paraesthesia design over
the patient to set up the right stimulation waveform. Every
patient requires a unique stimulation pattern to help control
their pain. The classification task involves predicting the gen-
uine or fake stimulaion of DBS from the data obtained from
Physionet [45]. To evaluate the performance of the proposed
approach, experiments were ran on following 10 features.
A typical brain stimulator has following parameters which are
used to control individual pain [46]:
• Stimulation Target: Parkinson’s disease which receives
chronic high frequency electrical DBS in one of
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FIGURE 4. Line plots of parkinson tremor stimulation pattern for different subjects.
three targets viz: the ventro-intermediate nucleus of the
thalamus, the internal Globus pallidus, or the subthala-
mic nucleus.
• Stimulation Rate: Frequency (Hz) of effective stimula-
tion (> 100 Hz).
• Intensity: It is experienced by the patient as the strength
of the paraesthesia, measured in volts (V). It can be set
from 0 to 10.5 V, depending on the patient’s needs.
• Pulse Width: A measure in microseconds (µs) of the
duration of a pulse. In general, the wider the pulse
width, the larger the tissue area being stimulated, and
the stronger the sensation of paraesthesia. For neuro-
stimulation, the pulse width is normally set at 180µs.
• Mode: Various stimulation alternatives can be utilized to
enhance comfort, increment battery life, and modify the
stimulation design. For instance: the continuous mode
conveys continuous electrical stimulation to the chosen
nerves over a drawn out timeframe on 24 hour basis.
After the patient gets accustomed to the vibe of stim-
ulation, the cycling mode is generally modified in light
of the fact that it might fundamentally expand battery
life, while regulating pain. The cycling mode conse-
quently invigorates for indicatedON andOFF duty cycle
e.g., 30 seconds ON and 30 seconds OFF.
• Electrode selection: This includes bipolar or unipolar
stimulation.
• Patient information: 16 subjects with Parkinson’s dis-
ease in the age group of 37-68 are studied.
• Code: Two conditions of DBS are studied viz with med-
ication (11) and without medication (10).
• Rest Tremor Velocity (RTV): It is defined as the tremor
which occurs when the muscles are not being voluntarily
moved. The recordings in this database are of RTV in the
index finger.
Figure 4 shows the plot with 10 subplots of Parkinson tremor
data for each stimulation parameter. The Parkinson tremor
dataset from Physionet is used to frame a forecasting problem
where, given the stimulation conditions and RTV for a time
period T , we forecast the stimulation condition and RTV at
T + δT . For this study, T and δT are set to 1 second. The
training makes the classifier learn the consecutive stimulation
pattern.
In this study, as seen in Figure 4, we can analyze the pattern
of deep brain stimulation. Here, we frame the supervised
learning problem as predicting the RTV at the current sec-
ond (t) given the RTV measurement and DBS parameters
conditions at the prior time step. The training is made on
8760 samples and validated on 164638 samples. Also, the fea-
tures are normalized to fed into the network. Finally, the stim-
ulation parameters inputs (X ) are reshaped into the 3D format
expected by LSTMs, namely [samples, timesteps, features].
The LSTM is defined with 50 neurons in the first hidden
layer and 1 neuron in the output layer for predicting RTV.
The input shape is of 1 time step with 9 features. We used
mean absolute error loss function and the efficient Adam
version of stochastic gradient descent. The model is fitted
for 50 training epochs with a batch size of 72. For this study
we calculate the loss between the actual stimulation param-
eter and the predicated consecutive stimulation parameter as
shown in Figure 8.
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2) PREDICTING THE REST TREMOR VELOCITY BY
EMULATING DIFFERENT ATTACK PATTERN
Adversary can apply different attack strategies as explained
in Section V in order to change the behavior of the patient
using DBS. In order to study the effect of deep brain stim-
ulation on amplitude and frequency characteristics of rest
tremor in Parkinson’s disease [43], different attack strategy
was carried out. RTV generally has a frequency of about
46 Hz for controlled neurological patients. It is considered
as the main characteristic to be measured for DBS implanted
patients. Besides this, Beuter [43] has studied four more
tremor characteristics. These are:
• Amplitude: It is defined as the root mean square of the
RTV signal. The increase in the RTV amplitude is con-
sidered as the sign of abnormality. For each patient, for
our study, we computed the amplitude for next 100 steps,
i.e., RTV for nearly 1 min.
• Amplitude Fluctuations: It is defined as the variability
of the RTV amplitude. Increasing scores indicate that
tremor amplitude is fluctuating over time and is consid-
ered as a sign of abnormality.
• Spectral Concentrations: It is measured by the concen-
tration of power in a narrow frequency range which is
set as 100 for our study. Decreasing scores are sign of
abnormality.
• Median Frequency: Median RTV is calculated for every
100 samples (1 min). Decreasing values are sign of
abnormality.
For this study, besides RTV, we also calculated aforemen-
tioned tremor characteristics to feed in the LSTM for training
and predicting purposes. Once the attack is classified, a warn-
ing is given to the patient about the attack to check the settings
of the brain stimulation and change accordingly.
For this study, the data is transformed and loaded from
the CSV file to the array that feeds in the LSTM. The
Keras LSTM layers take the numpy array of 3 dimensions
(N ,W ,F) where N is the number of training sequences,
W is the sequence length and F is the number of features of
each sequence. For this paper,W (read window size) is set as
50 which allows the network to get glimpses into the shape of
the RTV at each sequence. This process enable us to build up a
pattern of the sequences based on the prior window received.
The sequences themselves are sliding windows and hence
shift by 1 each time, causing a constant overlap with the prior
windows. We used 1 input layer (consisting of a sequence of
size 50) which feeds into an LSTM layer with 50 neurons,
that in turn feeds into another LSTM layer with 100 neurons
which then feeds into a fully connected normal layer of
1 neuron with a linear activation function. These steps will
be used to give the prediction of the next time step. We used
1 training epochwith this LSTM.With this 1 epoch, an LSTM
will cycle through all the sequencewindows in the training set
once. At each time step, we then pop the oldest entry out of
the rear of the window and append the prediction for the next
time step to the front of the window, in essence shifting the
window along so that it slowly builds itself with predictions,
FIGURE 5. Patient G rest tremor velocity analysis: With stimulation on
and medication on, RTV is close to zero (No attack).
until the window is full of only predicted values. In our case,
as our window is of size 50 this would occur after 50 time
steps. We then keep this up indefinitely, predicting the next
time step on the predictions of the previous time steps, to see
an emerging trend. We limited our prediction sequence to
50 future time steps and then shifting the initiation window by
50 each time, in effect creating many independent sequence
predictions of 50 time steps.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The hardware used for the training phase was nvidia GPU
card andWindows 7 operating systemwith nvidia Cuda 7.5 as
the general software architecture. For data preparation, train-
ing, and evaluating deep neural networks, the Keras [50]
framework with Theano [51] backend was used. The section
presents the data analysis of Parkinsons disease patients and
the results for the proposed work. It presents the study of
Parkinsons disease patients with and without the stimulation.
A. DATA ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS
FROM PHYSIONET DATA
Among all the features, Rest Tremor Velocity (RTV) is the
most important feature for evaluating the Parkinson tremor
intensity. It is considered as the first sign of neurological
disorder. RTV value is negligible or close to zero for nor-
mal individuals and controlled Parkinson disease patients.
Figure 5 shows the frequency of RTV values for patient ‘G′
from the physionet dataset. It is observed that the RTV is
generally close to zero when the DBS is controlled with
genuine stimulations.
The RTV for a Parkinson disease patient is shown in
Figure 6 on various conditions viz.: stimulation on, medica-
tion on; stimulation on, medication off; and stimulation off
andmedication off. It can be inferred from the figure that after
the DBS implantation, the RTV is controlled and the value is
mostly close to zero as compared to other conditions.
B. ADVERSARY ATTACK STRATEGIES
The adversary can employ different types of attack strate-
gies [47] inDBS.We have emulated different attack strategies
by changing the learnt stimulation pattern from study 1. The
different attack strategies that can be emulated in DBS are:
• Spike (Single Acute Spike Attack): Spike attack strategy,
as shown in Figure 7(a), are multiple data points with a
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FIGURE 6. Rest tremor velocity of a parkinson disease patient g2 for
20 sec (stimulator implanted in the globus pallidus).
much greater expected rate of change. These pattern can
be caused by multiple acute intensity pulses targeted to
the patient.
• Outlier (Multiple Overdose Attack Strategy): Outlier
attack strategy produces discontinuous acute stimulation
which produces the rest tremor velocity pattern shown
in Figure 7(b). It can be caused by high intensified pulse
at discontinuous stimulation rate.
• Stuck At Attack Strategy: Stuck-at attack strategy,
as shown in Figure 7(c) also make RTV experience zero
variation for unexpected lengths of time, which can be
caused by increased pulse width for a definite amount of
time.
• Incremental (Increasing Attack Strategy): RTV pattern
shows a increasing trend with the increased stimulation
rate, as shown in Figure 7(d).
• Chronic (Incremental Decremented Attack Strategy):
Chronic attack strategy looks similar to incremental
attack strategy with the continuous form of increase and
decrease in the RTV pattern, as shown in Figure 7(e).
• Noise (Arbitrary Attack Strategy): Noise faults make
RTV values experience unexpectedly high variation,
which can be due to hardware failure caused by the
adversary (See Figure 7(f)).
• Unusual Attack Strategy: The unusual attack pattern can
be caused by the adversary by arbitrary changing the
intensity, pulse width, stimulation rate and intensity of
the DBS. Here, the RTV pattern shows an arbitrary form.
The observable pattern of these attacks can be pictorially
represented in Figure 7. The emulated pattern is made by
changing the deep brain parameters such as stimulation rate,
intensity, pulse width, mode etc. as explained earlier. RTV is
the obervable pattern or outcome of simulations.
C. PERFORMANCE METRICS
The following performance evaluation metrics are used to
validate the proposed work.
• Training Loss: It is the average loss during the epoch
between real RTV and predicted RTV.
• Validation Loss: It is the average loss after the end of the
epoch.
FIGURE 7. Emulating different attack strategies in DBS. (a) Spike attack strategy. (b) Outlier attack strategy.
(c) Stuck at attack strategy. (d) Incremental attack strategy. (e) Chronic attack strategy. (f) Noise attack strategy.
(g) Unusual attack strategy. (h) Genuine measurements.
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FIGURE 8. Loss plot of the actual stimulation parameter and the
predicated ponsecutive stimulation parameter.
• Training Duration: Amount of time required to learn and
train the classifier for different attack strategies.
D. RESULTS
For study 1, we calculate the Root Mean Squared Error
(RMSE) to find the error between the predicted and actual
value of RTV. Figure 8 plot shows the train and test loss
during training. As seen from figure, the loss between the pre-
dicted and actual data is minimal. Also, the model achieved
RMSE as 0.095.
For study 2 (introducing attack strategies), we predict RTV
and calculate amplitude, amplitude fluctuations, spectral con-
centrations and median frequency to feed them as features to
LSTM. LSTM detects abnormality in the RTV, by observ-
ing the signals of amplitude, amplitude fluctuations, spectral
concentrations and median frequency, (which is calculated
by observing next 100 time steps). LSTM is used here to
predict the next epoch (50 steps forward). Figure 9 shows the
predicted and true attack RTV data values 50 time step ahead
at each step in time for 700 steps. The figure explains after
LSTM learns the system in such a way that even after the
introduction of attack (blue lines), it predicts the RTV should
be approximately close to zero. For instance, in case of spike
attack, RTV could reach upto 50, but the system based on the
learning predicts the genuine RTV should not be greater than
zero. Stuck at attack and incremental attack patterns predicted
RTV values comes approximately in the range of 0 − 3.
Further, Table 1 shows the training loss, validation loss and
training duration for different types of attack strategy for deep
brain implants. It can be seen for continuous and single pulse
attack patterns such as spike, outlier, incremental, chronic,
the loss values were less in comparison to the discontinuous
and arbitrary attack patterns(stuck-at and noise). Stuck-at
and noise attack pattern showed the maximum loss values
FIGURE 9. Emulating different attack strategy in DBS: epochs = 1, window size = 50, sequence shift = 50.
(a) Spike attack. (b) Outlier attack. (c) Stuck at attack. (d) Incremental attack. (e) Chronic attack. (f) Noise attack.
(g) Unusual attack.
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TABLE 1. Performance evaluation for DBS.
since they require more training as the pattern is hard to be
predicted. Whenever the predicted RTV and the true RTV
exhibited a difference, a flag was raised and consecutive iter-
ations was studied to predict the emulated attack. Our model
was able to classify the emulated attack strategies in the deep
brain implants and thereby raising the flag. As soon as the
attack is detected, the patient and the doctor is warned about
the attack and are notified to change the current stimulation
parameters set.
VI. CONCLUSION
Deep brain stimulators (DBS), a type of wireless implantable
medical device, treats neurological disorders by giving
stimualtions inside the patients brain. DBS have progres-
sively benefited patients, yet they have posed in parallel
certain security implications. Security for such devices is
important since they can directly affect the mental and phys-
ical orientation of patients. This paper utilizes Long Short
Term Memory, a type of recurrent neural network, to predict
and forecast the pattern of DBS. Rest Tremor Velocity (RTV)
is examined to study the intensity of neurological disorders.
For this, we studied and examined RTV values to design and
train the neural network. Various attack patterns were intro-
duced in the DBS framework to emulate and classify different
attack strategies. The results show that the model was able
to classify different attack patterns in the DBS with smaller
loss values and minimal training time. In the near future,
the proposed framework will be implemented on a real deep
brain stimulator environment with real RTV measurements.
To evaluate the performance of the framework in terms of
accuracy and reliability, genuine and fake measurements will
be classified and predicted at run time.
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